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In this paper we present and analyze the IMF’s labor market recommendations for
advanced economies since the beginning of the crisis, both in general and
specifically in program countries. Our analysis is informed by our reading of the
theoretical and empirical literature on the design of labor market policies and
institutions in advanced economies. We organize our discussion around two
concepts: micro flexibility, namely the ability of the economy to allow for the
reallocation of workers to jobs needed to sustain growth; and macro flexibility,
namely the ability of the economy to adjust to macroeconomic shocks. Achieving
both types of flexibility while protecting workers and maintaining incentives for
workers and firms to invest in existing relations, is not that simple, and the design of
labor market institutions faces delicate trade-offs.
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I. Introduction
In this paper we present and analyze the IMF’s labor market recommendations for ad-
vanced economies since the beginning of the crisis, both in general and specifically in
program countries. Our analysis is preceded and informed by our reading of the theo-
retical and empirical literature on the design of labor market policies and institutions
in advanced economies.
The crisis has forced researchers and policymakers to reassess the functioning of
markets, the design of policies, and the nature of optimal regulation. While the pri-
mary focus has rightly been on financial markets, the crisis has also raised questions
about labor markets. Consider, for example, three of the issues in advanced economies
that the IMF has had to confront in the past four years:
 Between 2007 and 2010, the unemployment rate in advanced economies increased
from 5.4 percent to 8.3 percent, and by the end of 2012 it had declined to only
8.0 percent. Assessing how much of this increase is cyclical and how much is
structural is central to the design of policies, both on the demand side and on the
supply side.
 Adjustment in periphery euro area countries must come in large part from
improvements in competitiveness within the common currency zone. Long-lasting
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relative decreases in nominal wages and prices. How can this be best achieved?
 Many advanced economies entered the Great Recession with low potential growth
and a high natural rate of unemployment. Higher growth and a lower natural rate
would obviously be good on their own, but they may also be essential for the
success of fiscal consolidation. Can labor market reforms help lower the natural
rate? Can they make a substantial contribution to potential growth?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the positions the IMF has taken on these
three issues, and on labor market policies, institutions, and reforms more generally,
and assess to what extent these accord with what we see as the lessons of the literature.
We organize our discussion around two concepts: micro flexibility, namely the ability
of the economy to allow for the reallocation of workers to jobs needed to sustain
growth; and macro flexibility, namely the ability of the economy to adjust to macroeco-
nomic shocks. Achieving both types of flexibility while protecting workers and main-
taining incentives for workers and firms to invest in existing relations, is not that simple,
and the design of labor market institutions faces delicate trade-offs.
These trade-offs, and how they are best managed, are the focus of the next two
sections. We make no attempt at developing new theory or gathering new empirical
evidence. In each case, our purpose is to summarize what we see as the main lessons
from the (gigantic) literature and draw policy implications. Having done so, we return
in the last section to the three issues listed in this introduction and discuss how the
IMF has approached them1.
II. Micro flexibility
Increases in the standard of living come from productivity growth2. Productivity growth
in turn requires the constant reallocation of resources. High-productivity firms must be
able to enter, low-productivity firms must be forced to exit. More-efficient producers
must grow faster than less-efficient ones3.
Good institutions are those that achieve this reallocation while limiting the welfare
cost to workers who have to move. For product markets, competition is the key force
behind reallocation and productivity growth. This means removing barriers to entry
and, more generally, to competition. A proper bankruptcy framework is also needed to
facilitate exit and encourage entry of new firms. For the financial sector, arm’s-length
finance and the availability of venture capital can facilitate entry of new competitors.
For labor markets, “protect workers, not jobs” is, in this case, the right motto.
Some countries are worse than others at achieving this last goal. For many workers, the
reallocation across jobs involves an intervening spell of unemployment. But the duration
of unemployment varies widely across countries, for no obvious efficiency reasons. In-
deed, some countries appear to do worse at both margins, with both lower flows and thus
lower reallocation, and longer unemployment duration (Figure 1). For instance, for much
of 1980s and 1990s, Portugal and the United States had similar unemployment rates,
about 6½ percent. However, Portugal had low flows and high duration, and the U.S. had
the reverse (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). This suggests that Portugal had both worse
reallocation (and likely lower productivity growth as a result, although the causal link is
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Figure 1 Unemployment rate, inflows and duration. Source: International Labor Organization (ILO).
Based on Perez and Yao (2012).
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In thinking about reallocation and unemployment, all labor market institutions ob-
viously matter, but two play a central role: unemployment insurance and employment
protection4.
The purpose of unemployment insurance is obviously to reduce the pain of un-
employment. The purpose of employment protection is to decrease layoffs and thus re-
duce the incidence of unemployment.
Unemployment insurance
For many reasons, workers can neither fully self-insure against unemployment nor buy
private unemployment insurance. Thus, unemployment insurance decreases the welfare
cost of being unemployed.
It has long been recognized that provision of insurance may come at the cost of effi-
ciency. Higher insurance leads to higher reservation wages and thus to potentially
higher wages and lower employment. A higher reservation wage is also likely to lead to
longer unemployment duration5. Longer search is not necessarily bad, as more time to
search may lead to better matching, but it leads to the danger that some of the un-
employed do not search, give up on search, or eventually become unemployable.
The large body of empirical evidence suggests that the insurance issue is highly rele-
vant. But what matters more than the level of unemployment benefits is the precise de-
sign of the system—in particular, how benefits decrease with duration—and the quality
of active labor market policies aimed at helping workers return to work6. In practice,
implementing effective active labor market policies is difficult: job search assistance
programs and training can be quite effective (in the medium term for the latter), but
public sector employment programs are less so.
Employment protection
There is a trade-off between mobility and stability. Reallocation is important for pro-
ductivity growth but much productivity growth also comes from stable employment re-
lationships. Some employment protection is thus desirable and is indeed offered by
firms that want their workers to invest in firm-specific skills. And some employment
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should take into account the costs they impose on society, namely the unemployment
benefits paid to the workers who are laid off.
The problem is that employment protection is sometimes excessive or takes the form
of complex legal and administrative restrictions on the separation process. It then ham-
pers the reallocation process and is likely to decrease productivity growth7. But even
the effect on workers’ welfare is ambiguous. While employment protection decreases
the risk of unemployment for those employed, it also decreases the ability of firms to
adjust employment, thereby increasing their costs, even given wages. And because it re-
duces the risk of being laid off, employment protection reinforces the bargaining power
of employed workers and hence may also increase wages. Higher costs lead to lower
hirings and thus to higher unemployment duration. The effect of employment protec-
tion on unemployment duration indeed appears to be sizable (Figure 2). In short, fewer
workers may be laid off, but those who are may face longer unemployment. The net ef-
fect on unemployment can go either way, but a given unemployment rate may hide
lower reallocation and lower welfare.
The effect of employment protection on the probability of being hired is particularly
strong for those workers whose productivity is a priori uncertain, such as new entrants
or the long-term unemployed8. For this reason, as well as in response to firms’ de-
mands for more flexibility, reforms of employment protection have often introduced
dual protection systems, with high employment protection on permanent contracts
coexisting with lighter protection on temporary contracts. In many cases these reforms
have had ambiguous effects, both on efficiency and on welfare. Constraints on renew-
ing temporary contracts have led firms to invest little in their temporary workers. And
temporary workers have suffered from a high level of employment insecurity, alterna-
ting between dead-end jobs and unemployment. While these contracts were initially
limited to young workers, they have been spreading to older cohorts over time. Workers
on temporary contracts may also suffer in other ways; for example, they often cannot ob-
tain mortgages and their unstable careers put them more at risk of being excluded from










































Duration of Unemployment versus Employment Protection
(months; 1995-2007 average)
Figure 2 Unemployment duration and employment protection. Source: Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and International Labor Organization (ILO).
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An important branch of research has focused on the cross-country evidence regarding
the effects of specific labor market institutions on the unemployment rate. (There has
been less systematic research on the effects of those institutions on reallocation or their
separate effects on unemployment incidence and unemployment duration). This re-
search has reached two broad conclusions: The devil is in the details (and the details
are hard to capture in the rough measures of institutions used in regressions); and the
combination of institutions matters very much. At the risk of caricature, we might say
that three labor market regimes have been identified—two of them relatively successful,
the third one not10:
 An “Anglo-Saxon” model—based on low employment protection and low
unemployment insurance—which leads to large flows, short unemployment
duration, and low unemployment.
 A “Nordic” model—based on a medium to high degree of employment protection,
on generous but conditional unemployment insurance, and on strong active labor
market policies—which allows for reallocation while maintaining low
unemployment11.
 A “continental” model—based on high employment protection, generous
unemployment insurance, and limited active labor market policies—which leads to
limited reallocation and high unemployment12.
These are surely caricatures, but the success of the Nordic countries in “protecting
workers, not jobs” has led to the belief that the Nordic model, also termed the “flexicurity
model,” is the direction to go to reform labor market institutions13.
One main question, however, is whether the success of Nordic countries reflects
underlying factors that may not be easily replicable. One of the striking results of the
cross-country evidence is the explanatory power of variables capturing the degree of
trust between firms and workers. Figure 3 shows the strong bivariate relation between
such a trust measure (in this case, the answer to the question: “To what extent are in-
dustrial relations conducive to labor peace?”) and unemployment across countries. The
relation remains strong in multivariate regressions, and the introduction of a trust vari-
able often reduces much of the estimated impact of the specific institutions (both in
magnitude and significance)14. This suggests that the common denominator between
successful countries is trust and that trusting partners can make widely differing combi-
nations of institutions work well.
This in turn raises two issues. The first is whether the relation is causal or whether
good institutions lead to higher trust. While identification is difficult, the evidence sug-
gests that it is indeed largely causal15. More generally, there is evidence that civic atti-
tudes matter for both the design and the functioning of labor market institutions. For
example, they appear to determine how much some of the unemployed abuse the un-
employment benefit system. And the greater the abuse, the more likely is protection to
be provided through employment protection, which imposes a larger efficiency cost.
The second issue is whether trust can be improved over time or whether low-trust
countries are condemned to endure poorly functioning labor markets. The evidence is
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Figure 3 Unemployment and trust 1/. Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
and World Competitiveness Report. 1/Trust between firms and workers is measured by the extent to which
industrial relations are perceived to be conducive to labor peace.
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has substantially increased since the mid-1980s (although, interestingly, it has decreased
somewhat since the beginning of the crisis). More research is needed to understand how
trust is created. But clearly, dialogue and negotiation between representative social part-
ners matters to reach shared commitments, and kept commitments increase trust16.
C. Tentative conclusions
There appear to be better and worse ways to organize trade-offs between efficiency and
social protection. The existing research suggests to us the following:
Workers should be protected more through unemployment insurance rather than
high employment protection (the flexicurity model). Unemployment insurance can be
generous but only if it is coordinated with effective active labor market policies. Un-
employment benefits should be conditional on reported job search, on training, and on
job acceptance if acceptable jobs are available. A good vocational training system for
adults coordinated with unemployment insurance is also essential. In practice, however,
implementing effective active labor market policies is difficult and costly. The empirical
evidence on the success of retraining programs is mixed; they have to be done right,
and often they are not17.
There is a role for employment protection, but it should be limited, linked to the
length of employment in the firm, and increasing continuously with tenure rather than
with the threshold effects that characterize dual systems. Dual employment protection,
where high employment protection on permanent contracts coexists with lighter regu-
lation on temporary contracts, should be avoided. Judicial uncertainty should also be
reduced. In many cases, judges can be called on by the workers to determine whether
the layoff was for cause or not, and whether the cause was economic or not, with dif-
ferent implications for the amount of severance payments. Such great scope for judicial
intervention potentially makes the process of layoff much more lengthy, costly, and un-
certain18. There should be some judicial recourse, but employment protection should
be more in the nature of a financial transaction than of a complex and uncertain bar-
gaining process.
Blanchard et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 7 of 232014, 3:2
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/2III. Macro flexibility
We think of macro flexibility as the ability of the economy to maintain a low un-
employment rate in the face of macroeconomic shocks. This flexibility has two dimen-
sions: a low average unemployment rate; and limited fluctuations in the unemployment
rate in response to shocks.
As was the case for micro flexibility, all labor market institutions play a role in macro
flexibility. For example, higher unemployment benefits lead to higher reservation wages,
thus higher actual wages, and likely higher unemployment. By allowing variations in em-
ployment to adjust through the employment of temporary workers, dual employment pro-
tection systems isolate workers on permanent contracts—those workers who are likely to
dominate bargaining—from labor market conditions. We focus here, however, on the three
institutions that matter most: the minimum wage, the tax wedge (which affects primarily
the average level of unemployment), and the collective bargaining structure (which
affects not only the level but also the responsiveness of unemployment).A. The minimum wage and the tax wedge
The minimum wage
The purpose of the minimum wage is obviously distributional, i.e., to make sure that
low-skill workers receive a wage high enough to live on. It has led to a long debate
about its welfare and efficiency effects. The standard argument is that a minimum wage
may exclude low-skill workers from employment and therefore may have adverse ef-
fects on both welfare and efficiency. The empirical evidence suggests that, within a
range, the effect on employment is small19. One potential interpretation is that, without
a minimum wage, firms may be in a strong bargaining position and pay workers less
than their marginal product; in this case, a wage floor may remove some of the firm’s
rents but still make it profitable for the firm to employ the workers.
While the minimum wage is an instrument of redistribution, there are limits to the
extent to which it can be used as such. It can provide a floor that prevents exploitation,
but more substantial redistribution is better achieved through a combination of a low
minimum wage and a negative income tax. Indeed, the two are complements: In the
absence of a wage floor, a negative income tax may simply decrease the pre-tax wage
while having little effect on post-tax take home pay.
The tax wedge
The tax wedge—the difference between the cost of a worker to the firm and take home
pay—is high in Europe. Many economists blame the tax wedge for higher unemploy-
ment, and indeed, it is a variable that is often significant in cross-country regressions of
unemployment on labor market institutions20. The indictment is too broad, however.
Some payroll taxes, such as retirement contributions, come with deferred benefits, and
should, in principle, have little effect on the cost of labor to firms. Even for taxes with-
out corresponding benefits, theory often predicts that the incidence should fall mostly
on workers rather than on firms. To the extent, however, that minimum wages or un-
employment insurance limit the decrease in wages, the tax wedge will increase the cost
of labor to firms and thus increase unemployment. Shifting to other taxes may indeed
be desirable.
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employment rather than on the fluctuations in unemployment; the structure of collec-
tive bargaining, however, affects both.B. Collective bargaining
Effects on the level of unemployment
Theory makes ambiguous predictions about the effect of centralized collective bar-
gaining on the level of unemployment. On the one hand, with centralized bargaining,
worker representatives are more likely to put some weight on the welfare of the un-
employed than they are under decentralized, firm-level bargaining. Other things equal,
this should lead to lower unemployment. On the other hand, relative to firm-level bar-
gaining, centralized bargaining increases the bargaining power of unions, which may
lead to higher wages and thus higher unemployment.
Centralized bargaining has been blamed also for not allowing for regional disparities, such
as productivity differences in the north and south of Italy. Similarly, it has been argued that
globalization and economic integration shift the balance in favor of more decentralized wage
setting which provides firms with more flexibility to adjust to increased competition. In the-
ory, centralized bargaining is not inconsistent with regional or sectoral differentiation of
wages. But if it does not recognize the need for such a differentiation, it may indeed be prob-
lematic. A similar issue may come from the equality of public sector wages we observe
across regions in some countries. To the extent that workers have the choice between public
and private employment, this equality of public sector wages can also limit regional differen-
tiation of private wages.
Intermediate levels of bargaining, such as sectoral bargaining, have often been criti-
cized on two grounds. The first is that, relative to centralized bargaining, they are likely
to put less weight on the welfare of the unemployed. The second is that, relative to
firm-level bargaining, they increase the bargaining power of the unions, with potentially
adverse effects on employment. A commonly-advanced hypothesis is that the effect of
the degree of centralization on unemployment is hump shaped, with either full cen-
tralization or full decentralization dominating intermediate levels of bargaining. The
cross-country evidence, however, appears rather mixed21.
Extension agreements, which characterize sectoral bargaining, can play a useful role,
especially where sectors are characterized by large numbers of small firms and estab-
lishments which cannot carry firm-level bargaining. Extension agreements also reduce
incentives to undercutting of reasonable employment conditions. However, the effects
of extension agreements depend on the quality of the bargaining process and the repre-
sentativeness of social partners. At times, by allowing workers to benefit from bargaining
outcomes even if they are not union members, they may decrease the representativeness,
and by implication the legitimacy, of unions and, by so doing, decrease the quality of labor
relations. This effect has been blamed, for example, for poor labor relations in France,
where collective bargaining coverage is high but union membership is very low. Extension
agreements should also provide enough flexibility when there is a wide dispersion of prod-
uctivity between firms, by including top up agreements for the most profitable businesses
or temporary opt-outs for firms requiring time to adjust as a result of adverse economic
conditions.
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Turning to the effects of the bargaining structure on the responsiveness of wages to un-
employment, the first point to make is an important macro point, namely that not all
macroeconomic shocks require an adjustment of wages. Decreases in internal demand,
for example, can typically be offset through lower interest rates with internal and external
balance reestablished at the same nominal and real wages. In some cases, decreases in
wages may even have perverse effects. To take an example that is very relevant today,
wage deflation can make things worse when the economy is in a liquidity trap: Higher de-
flation, combined with a zero nominal interest rate, implies a higher real interest rate and
thus lower demand, lower output, and higher unemployment. But there are also cases
where wages are too high and must decline, at least relative to (total factor) productivity,
to decrease unemployment. This is the case for example when the price of nonlabor in-
puts, such as oil, increases dramatically, as happened with the oil shocks in the 1970s and
early 1980s. Another example is a loss of competitiveness in a country that has either a
fixed exchange rate or is part of a currency area—the problem facing many euro area per-
iphery countries today.
In this case, theory suggests that centralized bargaining is likely to dominate firm-
level bargaining, for two reasons: because it is likely to give more weight to the welfare
of the unemployed than is firm-level bargaining; and because it can solve a coordin-
ation problem. When wages are negotiated at the firm level, a decrease in the wage at a
given firm is a decrease in the relative wage, something that workers will be reluctant
to accept. The process of adjustment in which all wages and, in turn, prices adjust is
likely to be protracted. When wages are negotiated at the centralized level, wages can
be adjusted at once and across the board without changes in relative wages. And firms
can commit to passing decreases in costs into prices, so the decrease in the real wage is
smaller than the decrease in the nominal wage.
C. Tentative conclusions
One has to be especially careful when discussing reforms of collective bargaining structure.
These institutions are deeply rooted in countries’ history and underlying social norms.
Moreover, the empirical evidence on their impact on labor market performance is scant,
and more research is crucially needed given the importance of the issue. Nevertheless, our
review of the economic arguments suggests that what is needed for efficiency is a system
that allows decentralized wage setting (adaptation “across space”, i.e., sectors, regions, firms)
while keeping coordination to help the macroeconomic adjustment. Conceptually, a com-
bination of national and firm-level bargaining seems attractive. Firm-level agreements can
adjust wages to the specific conditions faced by firms. National agreements can set floors
and, when needed, help the adjustment of wages and prices in response to major macroeco-
nomic shocks. Historical examples are the Wassenaar Agreement in the Netherlands in
1982 and the Moncloa Pact in Spain in 1977, which are both credited with dramatic im-
provements in labor markets in difficult circumstances22. Such agreements can indeed
greatly improve the adjustment. However, efficient forms of coordination of sectoral bar-
gaining can also be found, e.g. wage leadership of the tradable sector in Germany23. This
bargaining structure may be especially useful when there is large proportion of small firms
for which firm-level bargaining is difficult and costly. Our reading of the research and the
evidence on this topic again suggests that the devil is in the details and that, to succeed,
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Workers may not trust firms to reflect wage adjustments into their prices, and it may be dif-
ficult for firms to commit to such price adjustments ex ante.
IV. IMF recommendations during the Great Recession
Returning to the three labor market issues in advanced economies listed in the intro-
duction—the cyclical versus structural character of higher unemployment, the need for
improvements in competitiveness in the euro area periphery, and the potential for labor
market adjustments to lower the natural rate of unemployment and improve growth—
what did the IMF recommend, and did these recommendations fit the conclusions we
have derived above24?
A. Unemployment
The Great Recession led to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate, and unemploy-
ment has remained high to this day25. There is little question that the initial increase
was due to a sharp decrease in aggregate demand, and hence to an increase in cyclical
unemployment rather than in the natural rate of unemployment. Over time, however,
the proportions have become more uncertain. Some researchers and policymakers have
argued that, in a number of advanced economies, output is close to potential and un-
employment is close to a higher natural rate, and thus they advocate for a policy focus
on the supply side. One argument in support of that view is that, if indeed the un-
employment gap is large, inflation should be sharply decreasing; the fact that it is not
implies that the gap is small.
The IMF has taken the view that high unemployment was and remains largely cyclical,
that in most countries there is still a substantial unemployment gap, and that policies that
sustain aggregate demand are still of the essence26. The assessment that the natural rate has
not increased much is based in particular on the relative stability of the Beveridge curve—
the relation between unemployment and vacancies. Were there a large increase in the nat-
ural rate, it would show up as a rightward shift in the Beveridge curve, that is, as an increase
in unemployment given vacancies. There is little evidence that this is the case. Other mea-
sures of mismatch increased at the onset of the recession but returned to normal levels fairly
soon27. While the behavior of inflation remains indeed somewhat puzzling, the lack of defla-
tion appears to come largely from a strong anchoring of inflation expectations and a de-
crease in the effect of the unemployment gap on inflation rather than from a small
unemployment gap28.
This interpretation led the IMF to recommend a strong fiscal stimulus early in the
crisis. The assessment was that there was a high risk of a collapse of demand, and that
given the zero bound on monetary policy, fiscal stimulus was the only instrument rea-
dily available. While we shall never know the counterfactual, we believe that the fiscal
expansion prevented a much worse decrease in demand than actually took place.
Once the collapse was averted, the increase in debt—seen not so much as due to the
fiscal stimulus but rather to the large decrease in output and thus in government reve-
nues—led the IMF to recommend a shift from fiscal stimulus to fiscal consolidation.
Further fiscal expansion would have made the debt unsustainable, leading eventually to
sovereign default. The IMF emphasized that, while needed, consolidation would have
adverse effects on demand, especially in a context of simultaneous deleveraging in
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consolidation should proceed gradually where financing conditions permitted, relying
on credible and detailed medium-term consolidation plans to anchor expectations. The
effects of consolidation should be offset as much as possible by other measures to sus-
tain growth, from unconventional monetary policy to improvements of financial inter-
mediation to, in some cases, an improvement in the trade balance29. This still appears
to be the only path to recovery.
Although demand policies have been the primary focus in the advanced economies, other
policies have been aimed at decreasing the incidence and the pain of lower labor demand.
Particularly striking has been the experience of Germany, where the extensive use of short-
time work helped prevent a sizable increase in unemployment early in the crisis. Whether
this experience can be replicated elsewhere, and how to ensure that the programs are even-
tually phased out to prevent their coming in the way of reallocation, are open issues. But it
has clearly led to a reassessment of such policies at the IMF and elsewhere30.
With lasting high unemployment in most countries, however, unemployment dur-
ation has steadily increased. One argument against longer unemployment benefits,
namely that they decrease search intensity, is weaker in a severe recession: When va-
cancies are scarce relative to the pool of unemployed workers, any job not taken up by
one worker (because of provision of unemployment benefits) is quickly filled by an-
other. In its policy advice, the IMF has generally supported the extension of unemploy-
ment benefits, for instance in the United States. In the Iceland program, spending on
the unemployed quadrupled during 2008–10, mostly because of additional unemploy-
ment benefits. Under the Greece program, unemployment insurance benefits are being
expanded, initially on a pilot basis. But the IMF has also supported a reduction in bene-
fits where they were judged to be so generous that they significantly lowered incentives
for reemployment. This was the case in Portugal, where the unemployment insurance
system was one of the most generous in the EU31.
A prolonged period of unemployment, even if cyclical in nature, risks increasing the
natural rate itself—the so-called hysteresis hypothesis. The length of the crisis and the
protracted weak recovery increase the risk of the unemployed losing skills and getting
discouraged, turning the cyclical increase in unemployment into an increase in the nat-
ural rate. Three groups of workers—the young, the low-skilled, and the long-term un-
employed—need more-targeted intervention when demand and employment prospects
are depressed, and even when things start to recover: (1) the young because starting
their working lives in a depressed economy can jeopardize their long-term career paths
and earning prospects; (2) low-skilled workers because demand for their services may
be in secular decline, and even a recovery may not bring about an improvement in their
prospects; (3) and the long-term unemployed because loss of hope and skills may make
them permanent castaways from the labor force. In Iceland, program measures targeted
at such groups included expanding registration for unemployment benefits, job retrain-
ing, subsidized hiring, and study programs. In 2011, the availability of education was
improved by opening secondary schools to anyone below 25 years of age and promo-
ting work-related education.
The very unequal distribution of unemployment and its unusual concentration among
the youth in some countries in part reflects dysfunctional labor market institutions,
namely the dual employment protection systems we discussed earlier. In a number of
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reduce duality. This will not change things overnight; the large-scale destruction of jobs
has already happened in some of these countries. A smooth transition, as well as grand-
fathering existing contracts, may well make sense: Lowering employment protection on
existing contracts at this point would likely add to unemployment, though it may also fa-
cilitate the necessary process of economic restructuring. Reducing employment protection
on new permanent contracts, where it is excessive, can help stimulate the hiring of the
unemployed on more stable contracts as the recovery takes hold.
B. Competitiveness
In most countries, we argued above, macroeconomic policies should be the primary
tools to support employment, complemented by various micro policies to better share
the burden of unemployment. In a number of euro area countries, however, current ac-
count deficits were very large before the crisis, and the recovery must come in large
part from improvements in competitiveness at a fixed nominal exchange rate.
To become more competitive, a country has only two options: cut relative wages or
become more productive. Improvements in productivity growth are clearly the more at-
tractive channel, but reforms to raise productivity often involve changes in regulation
and behavior that take time to show their effects. Until those effects do take hold, the
only remaining option is to reduce relative wages: through currency depreciation in
countries with flexible exchange rates, and by explicitly cutting relative nominal wages
and prices in countries within a common currency area.
Shifting relative inflation rates
By definition, reversing the competitiveness gap in the euro area implies accepting
higher inflation in the North of the currency union than in the South. For example, to
meet the 2 percent inflation target at the euro area level, inflation must be lower than
the target in the South and higher than the target in the North. Thus, if it wants the
South to adjust, the North must accept more inflation, a point that has been empha-
sized by the IMF but has not been always fully understood.
National wage-cut agreements and the role of trust
Clearly the best way for periphery countries to achieve wage reductions is by common
assent, such as through a national tripartite agreement among social partners. The problem,
in general, is that workers may not believe that a wage cut is needed. Even if they do, they
have to be willing to trust that price declines will follow. The commitment on the part of
firms to cut prices if costs decrease is hard to verify and thus hard to enforce.
The IMF recommended such agreements, informally or formally, in a number of euro
area countries, but they were difficult to achieve or did not take place.
 In Ireland, despite a tradition of tripartite agreements from the 1980s on, discussions
turned contentious when conditions turned sour. The government undertook unilateral
actions on pay and pension cuts before an agreement with unions was reached again in
2010.
 In Spain, with inflation falling at the start of 2009 and the economic climate
deteriorating, social partners were unable to reach a national wage agreement for
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limited wage increases and postponed indexation.
 In Greece, with poor labor relations, no deal could be struck. In fact, real wages in
2009—which incorporated inflation expectations that turned out to be too high—
increased. This increased household incomes; but with wage growth outstripping
the euro average, competitiveness further suffered.
In the absence of national agreements, what (unattractive) choices are available?
Greater flexibility in wage-setting
More flexible wage-setting allows firms and their workers to set wages to levels that re-
flect firm-level productivity and restore competitiveness. In periphery countries that
had intermediate levels of bargaining (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), the IMF’s advice
was to facilitate opt-out clauses from collective agreements and move toward decentrali-
zation of collective bargaining to the firm level where intermediate level bargaining was
not delivering a sufficient adjustment.
Decreasing public sector wages
Such decreases help the fiscal situation, but they can also potentially affect private sector
wages and thus improve competitiveness. Whether such a strategy is justified depends on
whether public sector wages are initially too high relative to private sector wages and on
the degree of pass-through from public to private sector wages, which are the wages
which matter for competitiveness. In Latvia, some of the adjustment came via a sharp re-
duction in public sector wages and thus a direct improvement in the fiscal position. To-
gether with high unemployment, lower public sector wages put pressure on private sector
wages to adjust, though by how much is a matter of some disagreement. In Serbia, there
was a freeze on public sector wages in 2009–10—but with relief payments for those with
lower incomes—to bring them more in line with private sector wages.
Decreasing the minimum wage
Decreasing the minimum wage can be quite effective, as many wages move with the
minimum wage (especially when the wage distribution is compressed); but it is justified
only when the minimum wage is clearly out of line. As we argued earlier, the minimum
wage should be thought of as a floor rather than as the main instrument of redistri-
bution. This view led the IMF to recommend cutting the minimum wage in Greece (to
bring it back toward 40 percent of the median wage) and a freeze of the minimum wage
in Portugal after rapid increases during 2007–10 (in this case the level of the minimum
wage was not too far out of line with the EU average)32.
Fiscal devaluations through a shift in taxes
A potential way of increasing competitiveness that received a lot of attention is to de-
crease direct taxes and increase the VAT, a so-called “fiscal devaluation.” The basic idea
is that with nominal wages fixed in the short run, lower labor costs from a cut, say, in
social contributions will reduce export prices. The increase in the VAT will not bear on
exports and hence will not dampen this effect. Hence the tax shift can accelerate the
adjustment in the current account. This strategy is not a panacea, however: One can
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social contributions and the VAT would not be feasible. The IMF supported the idea of
a fiscal devaluation in a number of countries, including France, Italy, and Portugal. In
any event, despite much discussion of the option, fiscal devaluations have not thus far
been implemented during this crisis33.
C. Growth in the medium term
Advanced economies in general, and a number of European countries in particular, suffer
from very low potential growth. Some also suffer from a high natural rate of unemploy-
ment. A lower natural rate and higher potential growth are desirable on their own. But
they would also facilitate the difficult fiscal adjustment many countries face; and in the
countries that need to improve their competitiveness, they would allow a smaller adjust-
ment in relative wages. A lower natural rate and higher potential growth, however, are un-
likely to come on their own; they require structural reforms in product and labor markets.
Product market reforms
Structural reform in product markets—particularly lowering barriers to entry of new
firms—is likely to produce a larger growth payoff than reform in labor markets. By
making entry of new firms possible, lowered barriers to entry curb the market power
and rents of incumbents and thus expand activity levels and labor demand over the
medium term. A number of empirical studies find evidence that product market re-
forms lead to an increase in total factor productivity over the medium term and a de-
cline in the average rate of unemployment34.
In the short term, however, increased competition is likely to result in shedding labor
in some sectors and even a decrease in employment for the economy as a whole. Put
another way, unless the resulting productivity increases are matched by at least a pro-
portional increase in aggregate demand, employment will decrease. This is a particu-
larly relevant issue in the current context, in which macroeconomic policy tools to
increase demand are limited, and unemployment is already very high.
Moreover, the largest potential improvements in productivity are typically in the non-
tradables sector, where demand is relatively inelastic, so an increase in productivity
there is likely to decrease employment in the short run. In the tradables sector, where
the demand is more elastic, increases in productivity are more likely to lead to an in-
crease in employment; but because firms in this sector face greater competition in the
first place, there is typically less room for large productivity gains.
For these reasons, the IMF has cautioned that while product market reforms are es-
sential to the recovery, they may have adverse short-term employment effects and
should, at this juncture, be chosen carefully35.
Labor market reforms
Labor market reforms can lower the natural rate of unemployment; modify its incidence
on particular groups; and, by improving reallocation, increase productivity growth. In earl-
ier sections we indicated a number of labor market reforms that both theory and empir-
ical evidence suggest can indeed help.
Such evidence led the IMF to recommend a number of institutional changes without
which it believed the needed increases in growth may not be forthcoming.
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reform may not affect the unemployment rate very much, but it can help avoid the very high
unemployment rates among particular groups, such as new entrants, in a number of countries.
The IMF has also made recommendations aimed at increasing participation and em-
ployment rates. In many countries, the average age of the population is rising, and
people over 55 make up an increasing share of workers. The aging of societies poses
challenges for the sustainability of welfare regimes, particularly pension systems, if par-
ticipation rates do not keep up as well.
While countries may well want to differ in the participation rates of various groups, some
of the differences across countries appear to come from distortions. Removing these distor-
tions to increase participation is desirable, not only for its own sake, but also because it
again helps fiscally, for example by making it easier to finance retirement systems.
The rise in average labor force participation rates over the past two decades largely
reflects the entry of women into the labor force36. Nevertheless, with average female
participation rates nearly 20 percentage points lower than those for men, there is great
scope for further increase. The IMF has recommended reducing the secondary-earner
tax wedge―that is, the tax wedge applying to the spouse with the lower income in
two-earner couples―in countries that currently apply family taxation, such as France
and the United States. In other countries, lower marginal tax rates or targeted in-work
tax credits for secondary earners can help reduce distortions. The IMF has also recom-
mended that high and unconditional income support to families could be replaced with
programs that give higher benefits to those in work, such as childcare subsidies for
working mothers (which are relatively low in Austria and Portugal).
Another group for which labor force participation could be raised is workers aged 55 and
older. Here the needed reforms include increasing effective retirement ages. The IMF has
recommended raising statutory retirement ages where they are particularly low (France,
Greece) and adjusting pension benefits in several countries to actuarially fair levels.
Tougher rules governing disability benefits would also help. Participation in disability bene-
fit programs is quite high, exceeding 10 percent of the labor force in a few countries. Link-
ing disability benefits to work capacity and strengthening the attachment of disability
claimants to the labor force through active labor market policies could help in Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal. Under Romania’s program, the pension law increased the retirement
age, re-indexed pensions, and tightened conditions for early retirement and disability pen-
sions. The changes started in 2011 and are being implemented gradually. The minimum
pension thresholds were left unchanged to protect the poorest pensioners.
V. Conclusion
We have argued that economies need “micro” flexibility—the ability to reallocate re-
sources to generate productivity growth—as well as “macro” flexibility—the ability to
adjust to macroeconomic shocks. Designing labor market institutions so that they en-
hance flexibility while protecting workers is a difficult task. Nevertheless, our review of
the literature and evidence provides some tentative conclusions on how this can be done.
To have micro flexibility, workers should be protected more through unemployment
insurance rather than high employment protection (the so-called “flexicurity” model).
Employment protection plays a role in creating incentives for workers and firms to in-
vest in existing relations, but it should not be excessive. Dual employment protection,
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tection, should be avoided.
Macro flexibility depends critically on the collective bargaining structure. What is
needed for efficiency is a system that allows decentralized wage setting while keeping
coordination to help the macroeconomic adjustment. A combination of national and
firm-level bargaining seems like an attractive solution to the needs for both flexibility
and coordination. Firm-level agreements can adjust wages to the specific conditions
faced by firms. National agreements can set floors and, when needed, help the adjust-
ment of wages and prices in response to major macroeconomic shocks. This being said,
the implications of alternative structures of collective bargaining are poorly understood.
This suggests that the IMF should tread carefully in its policy advice in this area, par-
ticularly since governments may have limited ability to reform existing systems. More-
over, trust among social partners appears to be just as important in bringing about
macro flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining.
We have then looked at the labor market recommendations of the IMF since the be-
ginning of the crisis, both in general and in program countries in the light of these con-
clusions. Given the assessment that much of the increase in unemployment is cyclical,
IMF advice has been to maintain aggregate demand to the extent possible and to share
the pain of lower demand through extension of unemployment insurance benefits. In
countries that need to improve competitiveness, but also want to belong to a cur-
rency union or maintain a currency peg, the choices have been more difficult. Greater
flexibility in wage-setting (for instance through opt-out clauses from collective agree-
ments) and public sector wage cuts have been part of the adjustment process in IMF-
supported programs in these countries. Some of these recommendations have been
controversial, but we have done our best to explain their logic. A natural next step,
which we leave for future work, is to assess whether IMF advice was followed and
if so, proved helpful.
Endnotes
1In thinking about labor market institutions, two different visions are relevant and es-
sential to keep in mind. The first focuses on external labor markets, as captured for ex-
ample in the flow/matching models developed by Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides.
Those models focus on the large flows of workers and the process of reallocation across
firms (Diamond, 1982a, 1982b; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; and Pissarides, 2000).
The other focuses on internal labor markets and emphasizes instead the long-lasting
relations between firms and workers (for example Doeringer and Piore, 1971; and
Akerlof and Yellen, 1987).
2How productivity growth is distributed matters a lot if increases in living standards are
to be broadly shared. The increase in wage inequality in many advanced economies is in-
deed an increasingly important issue. But while labor market institutions play a role in this
context, many other important drivers, such as globalization and biased technological pro-
gress, lay largely outside the labor market. To limit the size of this paper, we leave aside the
issues associated with inequality and the role of labor institutions in that context.
3Evidence on the role played by resource reallocation in promoting productivity
growth is reviewed in Martin and Scarpetta (2012) and Syverson (2011). From the
workers’ side, indirect evidence also stems from the fact that voluntary job changes are
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/2typically associated with significant positive wage premia (Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2010).
4Blanchard and Tirole (2004) discuss the optimal joint design of unemployment benefits
and employment protection.
5Whether countries end up with high unemployment insurance and high duration of un-
employment or low insurance and low duration is partly a matter of social choice. In general,
there is a trade-off between welfare and efficiency. Countries should clearly avoid “interior”
solutions where they are giving up both efficiency and welfare. But once they are on the
welfare/efficiency frontier, social choice determines what point they pick on the frontier.
6Evidence on the effect of unemployment benefits and active labor market policies on un-
employment is discussed in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (2006) and Card, Kluve and Weber (2010); effects on productivity—through better
matching and encouraging firms and workers to go into high-risk, high-productivity jobs—
are discussed in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2007).
The evidence on the impact of unemployment benefits on flows of workers or jobs is mixed
(see, for instance, Gómez-Salvador, Messina, and Vallanti, 2004; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009;
and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2010).
7Evidence on the effect of employment protection on labor reallocation is reviewed in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010), Betcherman
(2012), and Martin and Scarpetta (2012); effects on productivity growth are discussed in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2007), Betcherman
(2012), and Martin and Scarpetta (2012). Bassanini, Nunziata, and Venn (2009) find that
mandatory dismissal regulations depress total factor productivity growth in industries
where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding, translating into a small negative ef-
fect on aggregate labor productivity growth. The difficulty in teasing out the effect on
productivity growth could reflect the fact that firms adjust to high employment protection
through capital and skill deepening and/or the fact that longer expected tenure leads to
more training of workers. The evidence on the impact of employment protection on the
unemployment rate is reviewed in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) (2006) and Betcherman (2012).
8Evidence on the negative effect of employment protection on the employment of
these subgroups is discussed in Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007); Betcherman (2012);
Jimeno and Rodríguez-Palenzuela (2002); and Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) (2004, 2006). For a discussion of dual employment protec-
tion, see Bentolila and Dolado (1994); Blanchard and Landier (2002); Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay (2002); and Dolado et al. (2002).
9See Boeri (2011) for a survey of dual labor markets.
10See for example Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
(2006); and Bertola, Boeri, and Nicoletti (2001).
11The two models also differ in another way: the Anglo-Saxon model is associated
with substantially more inequality than the Nordic model.
12These labels are broad characterizations and there are exceptions in the regional
groupings. For instance, Germany has moved away from the continental model and to-
ward the Nordic model by implementing the so-called Hartz reforms. These aim at im-
proving the efficiency of active labor market policies, reforming the benefit system to
activate the unemployed, and to some extent deregulating the labor market.
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lective bargaining structures. The “Nordic” model has centralized collective bargaining
and high union density.
14See for instance Blanchard and Philippon (2006).
15The concept of trust and its role in determining unemployment is discussed in
Blanchard and Philippon (2006). They use strike activity in the early 1960s and historical
evidence from the 19thcentury on the attitude of states towards early unions to construct
instruments for current labor relations and establish causality. Algan and Cahuc (2009)
discuss the role of civic attitudes in the design of labor market institutions.
16Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011) find that state regulation of labor markets and the
quality of labor relations are negatively correlated. They argue that state regulation can
reduce the possibility for workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the poten-
tially cooperative nature of labor relations. In turn, distrustful labor relations can lead
to low union density and high demand for state regulation.
17Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006) notes that
microeconomic evaluation studies of different active labor market policies suggest that de-
tails of program design are key. Low-cost assistance with job search works well, while pub-
lic job creation does not help much in bringing the unemployed back to unsubsidized
work. Policies that are found to be the most effective are intensive employment services,
individual case management, and selective referrals to long-term training programs.
18Ichino (2012) describes how the judicial system is key to a (mal)functioning labor
market. The general principle should be that economic decisions should be left to the
firm, and the role of judges should be limited to assessing whether dismissals are fair
or unfair. Reforms in that direction have proven difficult.
19Evidence on the effect of the minimum wage on unemployment is discussed in
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006), Betcherman
(2012), and Schmitt (2013). The minimum wage also plays a role through its effect on
other wages; this is relevant for macro flexibility.
20See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006) for a
review of the empirical evidence.
21See Calmfors and Driffill (1988); Scarpetta (1996); and Elmeskov, Martin, and Scarpetta
(1998). For surveys, see Flanagan (1999), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) (2006), Betcherman (2012), and Traxler and Brandl (2009). One open
issue is the role of sectoral bargaining. While unions see it as a useful coordination device,
labor economists often see it as counterproductive.
22The Wassenaar Agreement brought employer groups and labor unions together in
an accord that reduced the growth of wages in combination with the initiation of pol-
icies to curb joblessness and bring down inflation. The agreement is considered to
have broken the wage-price spiral, significantly boosting employment and economic
growth. The Moncloa Pact was an agreement reached in 1977 between the Spanish
government and delegates of political parties to set the basic shape of economic and
social policy during the political transition; it is seen as democratic Spain’s first social
contract.
23Jimeno and Thomas (2013) show that, disregarding externalities and other strategic
issues associated with the level of bargaining, “efficient” firm-level bargaining can be
reproduced with sectoral agreements provided that opt-out clauses are operative.
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grams in advanced economies in Europe.
25Dao and Loungani (2010) look at the human costs of this increase in unemployment.
26As we discuss below, changes in labor market institutions are useful over the
medium run, and may lead to faster wage and price adjustment over the short run, but
restoring aggregate demand is essential.
27Hobijn and Sahin (2012) find some evidence of shifts in only 4 of the 14 econ-
omies that they study (Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Diamond
(2013) explains why care is needed in interpreting these shifts; they may not reflect
a higher natural rate of unemployment either now or later. The behavior of other
measures of mismatch is described in Chen et al. (2011) and Lazear and Spletzer
(2012).
28The behavior of inflation is analyzed in a chapter of the April 2013 World Economic
Outlook (International Monetary Fund 2013a).
29International Monetary Fund (2013b) stresses the importance of improvements in
intermediation: in many countries, near-zero or negative credit growth has been a main
factor in the slow economic recovery.
30See Boeri and Bruecker (2011), Cahuc and Carcillo (2011) and Rinne and Zimmermann
(2012).
31See Stovicek and Turrini (2012) for a detailed cross-country comparison of the fea-
tures of the unemployment benefits systems in the EU.
32A joint report by International Labor Organization et al. (2012) for the G20
concludes that: “Maintaining the purchasing power of minimum wages at around 30 to
40 per cent of median wages sustains demand and reduces poverty and income inequal-
ities. Statutory wage floors systematically set at levels significantly above that range
entail the risk that these benefits would be more than offset by lost job opportunities,
especially for youth and low-skilled workers. Allowing the minimum wage to slip
significantly below that range risks exacerbating poverty while weakening demand”
(p. 12). The IMF has also on occasion recommended an increase in the minimum wage,
for example, in Lithuania in 2012.
33See Farhi et al. (2011) for a recent statement of the case for fiscal devaluation; and de
Mooij and Keen (2012) for estimates of the potential impact. de Mooij and Keen stress that
implementation of a fiscal devaluation requires many detailed choices that can “powerfully
modify the impact of the tax shift” and hence a solution “which looks easy on paper” can be
risky if not properly implemented.
34Using data for a panel of OECD countries and sectors over the 1984 to 2007 period,
Bourlès et al. (2010) find that stringent product market regulations reduce total factor prod-
uctivity in downstream industries. They estimate that aligning such regulations in upstream
industries to best-practice levels would raise total factor productivity by ½ to 3½ percent
over the next 5 years, and by 1½ to 10 percent over the next 10 years depending on the
countries considered.
35See the discussion in Barkbu, Rahman, and Valdés (2012).
36The recommendations for countries in this paragraph and the next are contained
in the paper on “Fiscal Policies and Employment in Advanced and Emerging










Change in trial period and regime
for collective dismissals; change of
part-time and overtime regime;
shorter notice period and revised
notice and severance payment
regimes
Sharp cut (from high levels); additional
cut in youth minimum wage; maturity
allowances in the minimum wage
frozen; minimum wage made statutory
(set by government, with consultation
of social partners)
Suspension of the extension of
sectoral collective bargaining
agreements; reform of firm-level
regime (suspension of favorability
clause; broadening the scope for
conclusion of agreements with work
councils and workers’ representatives).
Arbitration system switched to
voluntary recourse; length of collective
contracts limited
Automatic salary increases frozen;
public firms can align contract terms
to those in private sector
Iceland Spending on unemployment
increases, mostly through cash
benefits. Job retraining,
subsidized hiring and study
programs
Ireland Strengthened labor activation
and training for job seekers,
particularly long-term
unemployed. Targeted fiscal
policy and investment projects
to foster job creation




Substantial wage (including pay rate
and allowances) and personnel cuts;
further reductions to public sector
wage bill through improved rostering
and longer working hours; increased
redeployment possibilities within the
public sector
Latvia Emergency public works
program to help unemployed
Substantial wage (and price) cuts
Appendix
The table (Table 1) below provides a summary of the recommendations in IMF programs in advanced economies in Europe.

















Table 1 Advice on labor market issues in IMF-supported programs in Europe (Continued)
Portugal UI benefit reduced (from very
high levels). Steps to improve
education and training for
long-term and youth
unemployed
Reduction in protection (from
high levels), including cut in
severance pay. Reform of
overtime regime
Frozen (level not high but increases
during 2007-10 had outpaced
productivity)
Change in regime for firm-level
agreements (broadening the scope for
conclusion of agreements with work
councils and workers’ representatives);
change in regime for extension of
collective bargaining agreements
(ensuring significant representation
before extension of agreements to
whole sector)
Substantial wage cuts (including
elimination of 14th month salary)
Romania Reform of legislation governing
working time regime and fixed-
term work arrangements
Minimum wage raised (from initially
low levels)
Change in collective bargaining
regime aimed at promoting
decentralization of wage setting
Temporary cuts in public wages
(reversing increases during 2006-08)


















Blanchard et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 22 of 232014, 3:2
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/2Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare
that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to David Autor, Peter Bakvis, Larry Ball, Tito Boeri, Sharan Burrow, Pierre Cahuc, Mai Dao, John Evans,
Davide Furceri, Pietro Ichino, Juan Jimeno, Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, Stephen Pursey, Antonio Spilimbergo,
Alessandro Turrini, colleagues in IMF departments and IMF management for useful comments and suggestions.
Chanpheng Fizzarotti and Jair Rodriguez provided outstanding research assistance. We thank colleagues in our
Communications department and Shanti Karunaratne for editorial assistance. The views expressed in this study are the
sole responsibility of the authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board,
or its management.
Responsible editor: Juan F Jimeno.
Received: 28 October 2013 Accepted: 27 November 2013
Published:
References
31 Jan 2014Aghion P, Algan Y, Cahuc P (2011) Civil Society and the State: the interplay between cooperation and minimum wage
regulation. Journal of the European Economic Association 9(1):3–42
Akerlof GA, Yellen JL (eds) (1987) Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom
Algan Y, Cahuc P (2009) Civic virtue and labor market institutions. Am Econ J Macroecon 1(1):111–145
Barkbu B, Rahman J, Valdés RO (2012) “Fostering Growth in Europe Now”, IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 12/07.
International Monetary Fund, Washington
Bassanini A, Nunziata L, Venn D (2009) Job protection legislation and productivity growth in OECD countries. Economic
Policy 24(58):349–402
Bentolila S, Dolado JJ (1994) Labour flexibility and wages: lessons from Spain. Economic Policy 9(18):53–99
Bertola G, Blau F, Kahn L (2007) Labor market institutions and demographic employment patterns. Journal of
Population Economics 20(4):833–867
Bertola G, Boeri T, Nicoletti G (eds) (2001) Welfare and Employment in a United Europe: A Study for the Fondazione
Rodolfo DeBenedetti. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Betcherman G (2012) “Labor Market Institutions: A Review of the Literature,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 6276. World Bank, Washington DC
Blanchard O, Landier A (2002) The perverse effects of partial labour market reform: fixed-term contracts in France.
Economic Journal 112(480):F214–F244
Blanchard O, Philippon T (2006) “The Quality of Labor Relations and Unemployment,” Stern School of Business, NYU
Working Paper No. FIN-06-038. New York University, New York, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1293660
Blanchard O, Portugal P (2001) What hides behind an unemployment rate: comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor
Markets. American Economic Review 91(1):187–207
Blanchard O, Tirole J (2004) “The Optimal Design of Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection. A First
Pass”. NBER Working Paper No. 10443. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Boeri T (2011) Institutional reforms and dualism in European labor markets. Handbook of Labor Economics 4:1173–1236
Boeri T, Bruecker H (2011) Short‐time work benefits revisited: some lessons from the Great Recession. Economic Policy
26(68):697–765
Boeri T, Garibaldi P (2009) Beyond eurosclerosis. Economic Policy 24(59):409–461
Bourlès R, Cette G, Lopez J, Mairesse J, Nicoletti G (2010) “Do Product Market Regulations in Upstream Sectors Curb
Productivity Growth? Panel Data Evidence for OECD Countries”, NBER Working Paper No. 16520. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Cahuc P, Carcillo S (2011) “Is Short-Time Work a Good Method To Keep Unemployment Down?” IZA Discussion Paper
No. 5430. Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn
Cahuc P, Postel-Vinay F (2002) Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market performance. Labour
Economics 9(1):63–91
Calmfors L, Driffill J (1988) Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance. Economic Policy
3(6):13–61
Card D, Kluve J, Weber A (2010) Active labour market policy evaluations: a meta-analysis. Economic Journal
120(548):F452–F477
Chen J, Kannan P, Loungani P, Trehan B (2011) “New Evidence on Cyclical and Structural Sources of Unemployment”,
IMF Working Paper No. 11/106. International Monetary Fund, Washington
Dao M, Loungani P (2010) “The Human Cost of Recessions: Assessing It, Reducing It”, IMF Staff Position Note No. 10/17.
International Monetary Fund, Washington
de Mooij R, Keen M (2012) “‘Fiscal Devaluation’ and Fiscal Consolidation: The VAT in Troubled Times”, NBER Working
Paper No. 1793. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Diamond PA (1982a) Aggregate demand management in search equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 90(5):881–894
Diamond PA (1982b) Wage determination and efficiency in search equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 49(2):217–227
Diamond PA (2013) “Cyclical Unemployment, Structural Unemployment”, NBER Working Paper No. 18761. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Doeringer PB, Piore MJ (1971) Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York
Dolado JJ, García‐Serrano C, Jimeno JF (2002) Drawing lessons from the boom of temporary jobs in Spain. Economic
Journal 112(480):F270–F295
Elmeskov J, Martin JP, Scarpetta S (1998) Key lessons for labour market reforms: evidence from OECD Countries’
experience. Swedish Economic Policy Review 5(2):205–252
Blanchard et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy Page 23 of 232014, 3:2
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/2Farhi E, Gopinath G, Itskhoki O (2011) “Fiscal Devaluations”, NBER Working Paper No. 17662. National Bureau of
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Flanagan RJ (1999) Macroeconomic performance and collective bargaining: an international perspective. Journal of
Economic Literature 37(3):1150–1175
Gómez-Salvador R, Messina J, Vallanti G (2004) Gross job flows and Institutions in Europe. Labour Economics 11(4):469–485
Hobijn B, Sahin A (2012) “Beveridge Curve Shifts across Countries Since the Great Recession”, Working Paper No. 2012–24.
Federal Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco
Ichino P (2012) Inchiesta sul lavoro. Perché non dobbiamo avere paura di una grande riforma. Mondadori, Segrate, Italy
International Labor Organization, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary
Fund, World Bank (ILO-OECD-IMF-World Bank) (2012) Boosting Jobs and Living Standards in G20 Countries.
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_183705.pdf
International Monetary Fund (2012) Fiscal Policy and Employment in Advanced and Emerging Economies. Fiscal Affairs
Department, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/061512.pdf
International Monetary Fund (2013a) World Economic Outlook. World Economic and Financial Surveys, Washington
International Monetary Fund (2013b) Global Financial Stability Report. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC
Jimeno JF, Rodríguez-Palenzuela D (2002) “Youth Unemployment in the OECD: Demographic Shifts, Labour Market
Institutions, and Macroeconomic Shocks”, Working Paper No. 155. European Central Bank, Frankfurt
Jimeno JF, Thomas C (2013) Collective bargaining, firm heterogeneity and unemployment. European Economic Review
59:63–79
Lazear EP, Spletzer JR (2012) “The United States Labor Market: Status Quo or A New Normal?” NBER Working Paper
No. 18386. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Martin JP, Scarpetta S (2012) Setting it right: employment protection, labour reallocation and productivity. De
Economist 160(2):89–116
Mortensen DT, Pissarides CA (1994) Job creation and job destruction in the theory of unemployment. Review of
Economic Studies 61(3):397–415
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2004) “Employment Protection Regulation and
Labour Market Performance”, OECD Employment Outlook 2014, Chapter 2. OECD Publishing, Paris, pp 61–126
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006) OECD Employment Outlook 2006: Boosting
Jobs and Incomes. Paris
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2007) “More Jobs but Less Productive? The Impact
of Labour Market Policies on Productivity,” OECD Employment Outlook 2007, Chapter 2. OECD Publishing, Paris,
pp 55–103
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2010) “Institutional and Policy Determinants of
Labour Market Flows,” OECD Employment Outlook 2010: Moving Beyond the Jobs Crisis, Chapter 3. OECD
Publishing, Paris, pp 167–210
Perez E, Yao Y (2012) “Can Institutional Reform Reduce Job Destruction and Unemployment Duration? Yes It Can”,
IMF Working Paper No. 12/54. International Monetary Fund, Washington
Pissarides CA (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Rinne U, Zimmermann K (2012) “Another Economic Miracle? The German Labor Market and the Great Recession”,
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6250. Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn
Scarpetta S (1996) Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional settings on unemployment: a cross-
country study. OECD Economic Studies 26(1):43–98
Schmitt J (2013) Why Does the Minimum Wage Have No Discernible Effect on Employment? Center for Economic and
Policy Research, Washington
Stovicek K, Turrini A (2012) “Benchmarking Unemployment Benefit in the EU”, IZA Policy Papers No. 43. Institute for the
Study of Labor, Bonn
Syverson C (2011) What determines productivity? Journal of Economic Literature 49(2):326–365
Traxler F, Brandl B, (2009) The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining Coverage; A Cross-National Analysis.
International Labor Organization, GenevaCite this article as: Blanchard et al.: Labor market policies and IMF advice in advanced economies during the
Great Recession. IZA Journal of Labor Policy
10.1186/2193-9004-3-2
2014, 3:2Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
